HTRERelease 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030300010050 Sec	IND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS	D ADDRESS DAT	NAME AND	Ţ
(Security Classifi	A) R			<u>}:</u>
(occurry classifi				
CONTROL NO.				
			TION	
TCH RECOMMENDATION RETURN	DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION FILE RETURN	FILE RE	PROVAL MMENT	
			NCURRENCE	
			RKS:	VIAI
S, AND PHONE NO. DATE	ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. DATE	ODDESS AND PHONE NO	POM: NAME ADI	
SAID FIIONE NO.	ADDICESS, AND FROME IC.	JUNESS, AND FRONE NO.	NOM: HAME, ADI	

		-		
		I		
Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:				
those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE	those approved for the following NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE	those approved		
those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE	those approved for the following	those approved		
those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE	those approved for the following NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE	those approved		
those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE	those approved for the following NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE	those approved		
those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE	those approved for the following NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE	those approved		
those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE	those approved for the following NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE	those approved		
those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE	those approved for the following NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE	those approved		
those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE	those approved for the following NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE	those approved		
those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE	those approved for the following NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE	those approved		
those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE	those approved for the following NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE	those approved		
those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE rsday 8 September 1977 CG NIDC 77-209C	Thursday 8 September 1977	those approved NATIONAL Thursday 8 Sept		
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE rsday 8 September 1977 CG NIDC 77-209C NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION	Thursday 8 September 1977 NATIONAL SECURITY INFO	those approved NATIONAL Thursday 8 Sept		
those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE rsday 8 September 1977 CG NIDC 77-209C	Thursday 8 September 1977 NATIONAL SECURITY INFO	those approved NATIONAL Thursday 8 Sept		
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE rsday 8 September 1977 CG NIDC 77-209C NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION	Thursday 8 September 1977 NATIONAL SECURITY INFO	those approved NATIONAL Thursday 8 Sept		
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE rsday 8 September 1977 CG NIDC 77-209C NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION	Thursday 8 September 1977 NATIONAL SECURITY INFO	those approved NATIONAL Thursday 8 Sept		
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Ton Secretaria (Capture Control of the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE CABLE	Thursday 8 September 1977 NATIONAL SECURITY INFO	NATIONAL Thursday 8 Sept	Ato Double and	Cut

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T009754030300010050-9

25X1

National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, 8 September 1977.


The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

CONTENTS

USSR-PLO: Two-Stage Geneva Talks	Page l	
		25X1
AUSTRALIA: Northwest Shelf Gas	Page 2	
SPAIN-USSR: Communists Counterattack	Page 3	
RHODESIA: Kaunda and the Settlement	Page 5	-
		25X1
IRAQ: Government Changes Announced	Page 7	_
		25X1
BRIEFS:	Page 10	•

Panama South Africa Portugal

	USSR-PLO: Two-Stage Geneva Talks	
25X1	The Soviets used their talks with Palestine Liberation Organization chief Yasir Arafat to return to the idea of a two-stage Geneva conference, which was first proposed in a Soviet statement in April 1976. After that statement, the Soviets took the position that the PLO would take part in both stages of the conference, but Soviet commentary now suggests that the preliminary or organizational phase could be held without the Palestinians.	
25X1	Arafat reportedly told the Arab ambassadors in Moscow last week that Soviet officials had assured him that, whereas Moscow would attend the procedural stage of the Geneva conference without the PLO, it would boycott the substantive stage if the Palestinians were not invited. The communique following Arafat's talks in Moscow also omitted any reference to PLO attendance at the first stage of a Geneva conference, and Soviet commentary has ignored Arafat's references to Palestinian participation at any resumption of the conference.	
25X1	A Soviet academician told a US Embassy officer on 2 September that the omission of such a formulation on Palestinian attendance was "very significant." Such a formulation was a major part of Soviet government notes and statements on Geneva in 1975 and 1976. Soviet President Brezhnev, in a comprehensive statement on a Middle East peace settlement earlier this year, gave only cursory attention to the Palestinian question and omitted any reference to Palestinian participation at Geneva.	!5X1
25X1	The Soviets clearly want to remain vague on key issues prior to the foreign ministers' meetings later this month at the UN General Assembly. Foreign Minister Gromyko will be meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi at that time, and the Soviets may reveal publicly their current position on	iev.
25X1	a resumption of the Geneva conference.	!5X1



AUSTRALIA: Northwest Shelf Gas

25X1 //The Australian government has announced that it will permit the huge natural gas deposits off the northwest coast to be developed and that it will also allow the natural gas that is produced to be exported. The new policy will enable Australia to become a major exporter of liquefied natural gas by the mid-1980s, with potential exports of nearly 1 billion cubic feet per day for a period of 20 years.//

> //Prime Minister Fraser's decision to allow the exports reverses the previous government's policy. Would-be participants in the exploitation of Australia's natural gas have held that export markets are essential to development. Canberra will now permit the export of up to 53 percent of the

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

approach.

great econ meter pipe Western Au eastern ci tinue to b	//Shelf gas not exported will be reserved exclu- use in developing Western Australia, a state with omic potential but sparse population. A 1,370-kilo- line will be built from the northwest coast to Perth, stralia's largest city. Gas needs of Australia's ties, which contain most of the population, will con- e met from fields in Queensland, South Australia, ss Strait.//
overall in liquefacti least two a 120-kilo ready incl	//The shelf exploitation will be the largest ource project in Australian history, requiring an exestment of more than \$3 billion. In addition to on facilities and LNG tankers, plans call for at offshore production platforms connected to land by meter seabed pipeline. Japanese planners have aluded nearly all of the project's potential production estimates of Japanese LNG supplies in 1985.//
Proprietar Even thoug eign parti berra is a	//Prospects for progress on the project are bright, since Australia's largest companyBroken Hill y, Ltdand Shell Australia have joined forces. Australia's foreign investment policy limits forcipation in a resource project to 50 percent, Cancillowing the Shelf consortium's foreign partners their 52-percent share.//
million or overseas b ment allow	//Canberra has also aided the project by exempting ce projects involving capital expenditures of \$500 more from any restrictions that may be imposed on corrowing, by extending the current 20-percent investance, and by introducing new income tax concessions eum exploration and development.

25X1	The Spanish party's international secretary, Manuel Azcarate, told a US Embassy source last week that his party has every intention of keeping alive the polemic with the Soviets but will stop short of a complete break with Moscow. He candidly admitted that the party was adopting this tactic mainly for the domestic political dividends that are likely to follow.
25X1	The dispute between the Spanish and Soviet parties—which have been at loggerheads since the Spanish party denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968—flared up again in late June, when an unsigned article in the Soviet foreign policy journal New Times attacked the tenets of Euro-communism as espoused by Spanish party leader Santiago Carrillo in a recent book. The New Times article warned that Carrillo's views, if put into practice, would lead to a split in the Communist movement.
25X1	The spirited defense of Carrillo by his party and modest support received from the Italian and French Communist parties was followed by more Soviet articles, which became gradually less abrasive.
25X1	The renewed offensive by the Spanish party will come in the next edition of the party's bi-monthly theoretical journal, Our Flag. Written by executive committee member Jaime Ballesteros, the draft article responds to the New Times attack on Carrillo and sketches previous attempts by Moscow to divide the Spanish party and denounce the principle of Eurocommunism.
25X1	Ballesteros labels the New Times article a form of "ideological terrorism" similar to the treatment of Soviet dissidents, and he accuses the authors of having an obsolete idea of world Communism and of West European reality. He concludes by affirming that the Spanish party will continue to stand behind Carrillo and the principle of Eurocommunism.
25X1	The Soviet motives for the New Times attack on Carrillo were never clear, but if Moscow hoped to drive a wedge between the outspoken Spanish party and its Italian and French Eurocommunist allies, it was disappointed. Nor was Carrillos' authority within his own party undermined.

25X1	On the contrary, the Soviet diatribe rallied the Spanish Communists around Carrillo and buttressed the party's claims of independence from Moscow. Spanish Communist leaders maintained, in fact, that if the attack had come prior to the Spanish parliamentary election on 15 June, their electoral fortunes might have been better.	
25X1	It seems to be this sentiment that has led the Spanish party to try to goad the Sovietswho have of late adopted a more cautious toneinto lashing out again. Municipal elections are due to be held in Spain before the end of the year, and the Communists are anxious to regain some of the ground they lost to the Socialists in June.	25X1
	RHODESIA: Kaunda and the Settlement	
25X1	The African front-line presidents generally support the British-US settlement proposals on Rhodesia that were announced last week, although they are awaiting a response from Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith. Surprisingly, however, Zambian President Kaunda, long a steadfast supporter of a negotiated settlement and an active participant in the British-US initiative, has been highly critical of the package for not going far enough and already is anticipating that Smith will reject the proposals.	
25X1	In a speech honoring visiting Nigerian Head of State Obasanjo, Kaunda described the settlement package as a "non-starter." He criticized the proposals for not specifying what actions the US and UK would take if Smith rejected the package, or how Smith would then be forced from power.	
25X1	Kaunda added that the package should have been presented to Smith with a timetable that would have stopped the flow into Rhodesia of oil that evades international sanctions. His remarks concerning an oil embargo, long a favorite theme of his and one the presidents may pursue, were probably aimed at eliciting help from Obasanjo as the head of an OPEC member state.	
25X1	Kaunda's criticism, although not indicative of the other front-line presidents' views of the British-US effort, does mirror the presidents' concern that Smith will reject the	

Approved For Release 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP79T009754030300010050-9

Altorting increases to face the increase The designtened last order town. To order town abusaka and seconds are seconds and seconds and seconds are seconds as a second and second and second and second are seconds as a second and second and second are second as a second are s	nough fully committed ased insurgent operation in military retaliation in surgent buildup Zambian President's for week by a Rhodesian	ioang word almost and the
oorder town. Doy ordering a Jusaka and sev	ot week by a knodesian	ears were almost certainly
ircraft.	Diackout and a curtew	air attack on a Zambian solution as characteristic impetuosity for an indefinite period in the within range of Rhodesian
ism at home	or his constant invol	he future may also result as been coming under criti-vement in the Rhodesia issue ic problems are growing.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1



IRAQ: Government Changes Announced

Iraq recently announced government changes that could indicate a major reorganization is under way. The Revolutionary Command Council--ostensibly the highest legislative body--was expanded from five members to 22, all of whom are members of the Baath Party's regional command.

The shuffle may be the latest in a series of moves designed to strengthen Command Council Deputy Chairman Saddam Husayn's prospects for succeeding ailing President Bakr; it upgrades the positions of Saddam's supporters within the party and brings the Command Council directly under party control. In January the Baath Party's regional command was expanded from 13 to 21 members, and 11 command members were named ministers of state.

These ministers—all young, dedicated Baathists

Toyal to Saddam but with little experience outside the party—
are the ones now being shifted to the Revolutionary Command

Council. The 11 have at the same time been dropped from the
cabinet. The US Interests Section believes the cabinet will
now be downgraded to a subordinate executive body.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030300010050-9

The changes also further isolate and dilute the power of two council members who may be perceived by Saddam as threatsCommunications Minister Sadun Ghaydan al-Ani and Public Works Minister Taha Yasin Ramadhan, who also heads the Peoples Army.	,
The shuffle institutionalizes party control over the highest government body, and it may have been made in response to party pressure for an expanded and more obvious role in the decision-making process. The Revolutionary Command Council may not play a significant role on a day-to-day basis, but it does have symbolic importance and could be a powerful force in determining control of the government in a succession crisis.	,
A relatively important body at the time of the 1968 revolution, the council has functioned in recent years more or less as a rubber stamp, approving government policies made elsewhere without prior consultation. It is not clear whether the expanded council will play a more active role in decision-making.	
The changes may have policy implications as well. Saddam has been held responsible by both party and public in the past several years for breakdowns in the economy, food shortages, and inflation. The party has also criticized his policy of resuming friendly relations with the more conservative Arab states. Making the party a more open participant in the government could be intended to moderate some of this criticism.	
	25X1
Saddam is usually careful not to upstage or criticize the President, and Bakr apparently is unwilling to challenge Saddam openly. Neither is willing to risk an open break in the party, which could threaten the survival of the regime. There probably was agreement between Bakr, Saddam, and Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, the Interior Minister and probable number-three man in the regime, on the recent changes.	25X1 25X
	communications Minister Sadun Ghaydan al-Ani and Public Works Minister Taha Yasin Ramadhan, who also heads the Peoples Army. The shuffle institutionalizes party control over the highest government body, and it may have been made in response to party pressure for an expanded and more obvious role in the decision-making process. The Revolutionary Command Council may not play a significant role on a day-to-day basis, but it does have symbolic importance and could be a powerful force in determining control of the government in a succession crisis. A relatively important body at the time of the 1968 revolution, the council has functioned in recent years more or less as a rubber stamp, approving government policies made elsewhere without prior consultation. It is not clear whether the expanded council will play a more active role in decision-making. The changes may have policy implications as well. Saddam has been held responsible by both party and public in the past several years for breakdowns in the economy, food shortages, and inflation. The party has also criticized his policy of resuming friendly relations with the more conservative Arab states. Making the party a more open participant in the government could be intended to moderate some of this criticism. Saddam is usually careful not to upstage or criticize the President, and Bakr apparently is unwilling to challenge Saddam openly. Neither is willing to risk an open break in the party, which could threaten the survival of the regime. There probably was agreement between Bakr, Saddam, and Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, the Interior Minister and probable number-treature.

		,
		25X

BRIEFS

Panama 25X1 //Anticipated Panamanian student demonstrations yesterday against the canal treaty were squelched by firm action by the National Guard. Several hundred students from Panama's largest secondary school--which refused Chief of Government Torrijos' invitation to send representatives to the treaty signing in Washington--stoned the Foreign Ministry before being dispersed.// 25X1 //With Torrijos and his right-hand man, intelligence chief Lieutenant Colonel Noriega, in Washington, the National Guard undoubtedly has standing orders to act forcefully to prevent serious disorders. There were several arrests, and schools were reportedly closed for the day. 25X1 South Africa 25X1 Students and teachers are boycotting the schools in South Africa's racially tense Soweto township; the schools were scheduled to reopen on Tuesday under direct government

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

from jail almost all the Portuguese prisoners the Angolans held.

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030300010050-9

(Security Classification)